EXHIBIT K

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

BENJAMIN GROSS, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs,

V.

GFI GROUP, INC., COLIN HEFFRON, and MICHAEL GOOCH,

Defendants.

Case No.: 1:14-CV-09438-WHP

VIDEO DEPOSITION OF William Purcell September 25, 2017 New York, New York

Lead: John Lynch, Esquire

Firm: Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz

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Page 41 1 price, and I think through the efforts of the 2 special committee and what have you, they got 3 him up to 165, plus the assumption of the 4 RSUs, but I think at one point it was at 145 5 and even a little bit lower at one point. 6 they did get him up from what he wanted to do 7 initially. 8 And the "they" there is the special Q. 9 committee, right? 10 Α. Yes. 11 And so if you testified early that 12 Mr. Gooch paid the absolute minimum for the 13 IDB that he could pay, that's not correct, 14 right? 15 MR. ZWICK: Objection. 16 I did not say that. Α. 17 Let me just get my MR. ZWICK: 18 objections in. 19 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. 20 MR. ZWICK: Go ahead. 21 I did not say that. I said based 22 on the evidence, his intent was to always be 23 able to pay as little as possible, and he got 24 negotiated up somewhat. But his intent was 25 to always pay -- to own the IDB for as least

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Page 42 1 money as possible. 2 BY MR. LYNCH: 3 He was a buyer, right? Ο. 4 Α. Yes. 5 And that was obvious from the face 0. 6 of the press release that he was a buyer of 7 the brokerage business, right? 8 MR. ZWICK: Objection. 9 Α. That's correct, from the press 10 release, yes. 11 BY MR. LYNCH: 12 And as a matter of pure economics, Q. 13 it's perfectly obvious that a buyer would 14 prefer to pay as little as possible for 15 assets that he was to acquire, correct? 16 It's correct with an expanded Α. 17 answer. 18 What's your expanded answer? Ο. 19 Given the press release and the 20 fact that a special committee was there and a 21 special committee unanimously approved it, 22 any reasonable investor would assume that a 23 normal process had gone on with a special 24 committee because there were many special 25 committees, and that process is reasonably

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1 well known. The role of the special 2 committee is to try and create, in effect, an 3 arm's length transaction of all the parties to get the highest price possible for the 4 5 shareholders of the company. And the press 6 release didn't say the special committee 7 had -- or even the fairness opinion of 8 Greenhill was subject to certain limitations, 9 which were evident when the proxy came out, 10 that all the things the special committees considered and the interference with Gooch 11 12 and the special committee and the fact that Gooch said he wouldn't sell to anybody else, 14 none of that was disclosed in the press 15 release. It wasn't even disclosed in the 16 press release that there were certain 17 limitations on the fairness opinion or the 18 work of the special committee. 19 reasonable investor would have no reason to 20 believe, other than the fact that a normal 21 special committee process had gone forward 22 and that everybody was satisfied that -- for 23 instance, there was no fairness opinion on 24 the IDB, even though CME had asked for one

late in the process. But most reasonable

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- investors would assume a complete process had
- been done and there was no interference or
- 3 limitations on the work of the special
- 4 committee.

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- Q. You referred a few times there to a normal special committee process. What's a normal special committee process, for you?
- 8 A. A normal special committee process
- 9 is, as I said before, to create an arm's
- length type of transaction, which means there
- will be no conflicts. And even if the
- management wants to buy the company, the
- special committee has done everything
- possible to make sure that that price is as
- high as possible, including talking to other
- people and trying to set up a competitive
- situation to make sure that the price is as
- high as they can possibly get it.
- 19 Q. Is it your view that under
- 20 generally accepted investment banking
- 21 methodologies in an M&A selling process that
- there needs to be a market check?
- A. Again, it was one of the comments
- that Mr. Fisher made. On rare occasions,
- 25 sometimes there are situations -- and an

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Page 48 1 when the company -- when management says that 2 they may want to buy the company, but it can 3 go either way. You know, it depends when that special committee is formed. 4 5 I will just ask the question again. Ο. 6 Have you ever done any empirical analysis or 7 seen any empirical analysis that measures how 8 frequently pre-signing market checks are 9 conducted in special committee M&A selling 10 processes as opposed to pursuing a single 11 bidder strategy? 12 I haven't seen such a setting. Α. 13 Well, one of the ways that a 14 special committee can protect shareholders is 15 to negotiate a deal with a single bidder and 16 execute a merger agreement that contains a 17 fiduciary out provision, right? 18 Α. Yes. 19 MR. ZWICK: Objection. 20 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. 21 I mean, generally speaking, you 22 know, it's rare to see no fiduciary out in an 23 agreement. 24 BY MR. LYNCH: 25 Ο. But that's one of the ways that a

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    special committee can protect shareholders,
1
2
    right?
3
         Α.
                Well, yes. But before they do
    that, they feel comfortable that they have
4
5
    done everything possible to get the highest
6
    price possible, and they have a fiduciary out
7
    in case somebody comes along. I think there
8
    have been plenty of studies done that
9
    indicate that as a percent of total deals,
    the number of deals that come in on a basis
10
11
    of a fiduciary out is a rather small
12
                 I don't know whether it's 15
    percentage.
13
    percent, what have you. I can't remember.
14
    But it's -- once they have done their job,
15
    it's more common that no competing deal comes
16
    in than it is that a competing deal does come
17
    in.
18
                Have you ever seen any empirical
         Ο.
19
    analysis or research or conducted any
20
    analysis yourself that persuades you or
21
    convinces you that conducting a pre-signing
22
    market check leads to superior pricing on
23
    sell-side assignments than following a
24
    strategy of negotiating with a single bidder
25
    and including a fiduciary out?
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Page 87 1 BY MR. LYNCH: 2 And that's the sentence that you Ο. 3 are opining is misleading, correct? 4 Α. Correct. 5 And just for the record, it reads, Ο. 6 "Optimizing GFI's value for stockholders has 7 been a goal of management since becoming a 8 public company in 2005, and this transaction 9 represents a singular and unique opportunity 10 to return value." 11 Have I read that right? 12 Α. Yes. 13 Okay. The sentence before that, 14 the first sentence that's attributed to 15 Mr. Gooch, reads, "We are very pleased to 16 announce this transaction with CME Group and 17 the substantial premium and liquidity it 18 delivers to our stockholders." 19 Do you see that? 20 Α. Yes. 21 Do you believe that's false? Q. 22 Α. No. 23 No reason to believe that's false, Ο. 24 correct? 25 It was, quote, a substantial Α. No.

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Page 88 1 premium, about 46 percent, and CME was a very 2 liquid stock. 3 More liquid than the GFI Group Q. stock, right? 4 5 Α. Yes. 6 So a stock deal with the CME Group, 7 if it closed, would have delivered liquidity to GFI shareholders, right? 9 Α. Yes. 10 As well as a substantial premium, 11 right? 12 Yes. Α. 13 The third sentence of the comment 14 reads, "I am very proud of what our Trayport 15 and Fenics teams have achieved since becoming 16 a part of GFI." 17 Do you see that? 18 Α. Yes. 19 And those are the -- Trayport and 20 Fenics are the two software businesses that 21 were being sold to CME in a two-step 22 transaction, right? 23 Α. Yes. 24 Q. The sale of those businesses to CME 25 Group in exchange for CME stock was a way of

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Page 90 1 reasonable statement. 2 Okay. The fourth sentence of the 3 comment that's attributed to Mr. Gooch reads, 4 "We are excited that these businesses will 5 become part of a dynamic and highly regarded 6 company where their immediate strategic value 7 can be further realized within CME." 8 Do you see that? 9 Α. Yes. 10 That's a true statement, right? Q. 11 I mean, it's a reasonable 12 statement. I assume that's what he believed. 13 And there is no reason to believe that would 14 not be correct. 15 Okay. And the two businesses that Q. 16 are referred to there are Trayport and 17 Fenics, right? 18 Α. Yes. 19 And the CME Group, that's the 20 business that owns the Chicago Mercantile 21 Exchange, right? 22 Α. Yes. That's what CME stands for, 23 so, yes. 24 And that's a highly regarded 25 company, right?

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Page 91 1 Α. It is. And it's a dynamic company, right? 0. 3 MR. ZWICK: Objection. 4 Α. I mean, that's a point of view. 5 mean, it's an aggressive company. It's done 6 very well. So I have no problem with the 7 word "dynamic." 8 BY MR. LYNCH: 9 If you go back to the first page of 10 the press release, the very first bullet 11 underneath the headline reads, "CME Group to 12 acquire Trayport and Fenics from GFI Group," 13 right? 14 Α. Well, it just ended with a period It didn't say --15 there. 16 "For media release" -- there's a 0. 17 headline --18 Oh, I'm sorry. I thought you meant 19 the first bullet under that. 20 0. I see what you mean. 21 Α. Okay. Yes. 22 Q. There is a set of three bullets 23 towards the top of the page. 24 Α. Right. Okay. 25 The first bullet reads, "CME Group Q.

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Page 98 Α. Yes. 2 Okay. We are still on the first 0. 3 paragraph of the text of the press release, 4 right? 5 Right. The second bullet, though. Α. 6 The second bullet of the first 0. 7 paragraph. 8 Α. Right. 9 And it was clear from the text that 10 we have just read that Mr. Gooch and 11 Mr. Heffron had an interest in the 12 transaction, right? 13 Α. Correct. 14 Ο. It was clear from that text that 15 Mr. Gooch and Mr. Heffron stood on both sides 16 of the transaction, right? 17 Α. Correct. 18 Both as sellers of their GFI stock 19 and buyers of the IDB business, right? 20 Yes. And that's why there was a 21 special committee, which was also mentioned 22 in the press release. 23 Q. Right. And so it was clear also 24 that the special committee -- from the 25 involvement -- clear to investors, anyway,

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- 1 from the involvement of the special committee
- that there was some attempt to address the
- fact that there were directors on both sides
- of the transaction, right?
- 5 A. Yes.
- 6 Q. And that would be clear to GFI
- stockholders in reading the press release,
- 8 right?
- 9 A. Yes, because the special committee
- was mentioned.
- 11 Q. You have had experience in the
- drafting of press releases that announce
- merger agreements, right?
- 14 A. Yes. I mean, I have read them.
- Usually the investment banker does not get
- involved in the actual language.
- Q. Have you ever been involved in the
- 18 drafting of a press release?
- 19 A. Other than reviewing it, no.
- Because most people have, as in this case,
- their public relations department or whatever
- you want to call them that work on press
- releases.
- O. But bankers do review them?
- A. If they are mentioned and they are

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- 1 process to maximize or optimize the value
- being obtained for the IDB. In fact, it was
- 3 just the opposite.
- Q. Do you believe the special
- 5 committee in the CME deal or in the process
- 6 leading up to the CME deal did the best they
- 7 could to achieve value for GFI shareholders
- 8 under the circumstances that they confronted?
- 9 A. I believe so and that's so stated
- in the proxy and so stated in the Greenhill
- 11 fairness opinion. Given both the assumptions
- 12 and limitations that were before them in
- terms of limiting the number of strategic
- 14 alternatives that they could pursue, they
- believe they had basically done the best they
- 16 could do given Gooch's position and
- interference.
- Q. And you agree with that, right?
- 19 A. I didn't see anything that would be
- 20 negative reflecting on either Greenhill or
- the special committee. They did the best
- they could under the circumstances it
- ²³ appeared.
- Q. Throughout -- we have done a little
- bit of talking about the word "optimizing" in

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Page 141 1 The book that lists synonyms -- I'm 2 not sure -- I will take your word for it. 3 Forget about Thesaurus' for the Ο. 4 moment. You said you looked at dictionaries 5 too, right? 6 Α. Yes. 7 What dictionaries did you look at? Ο. 8 Α. I have Websters and Colliers. 9 don't have more than two dictionaries. 10 people don't. 11 I may have asked you this earlier, Q. 12 but we were talking a little bit about the 13 possibility that M&A transactions, once they 14 are announced, can get topped. 15 Do you remember that testimony? 16 Yes. Α. 17 And you agreed that it's always 0. 18 possible that an announced merger transaction 19 might be topped by an alternative bidder. 20 Do you remember that? 21 Yes. Α. 22 Q. Reasonable investors understand 23 that, right? 24 Α. That that could happen, yes. 25 this case, I don't think they thought that

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Page 142 1 would happen, as I say, because of the 2 special committee and their control 3 shareholder, and there wouldn't be any 4 conflicts in his strong statement in the 5 press release. I believe most reasonable 6 investors did not think that. 7 As I said, the stock pattern all 8 the way up to September 8th indicated that. 9 Very little change in any single day. 10 Back to the "optimize" and 0. 11 "maximize" and your consultation of books 12 that told you that they were synonyms. 13 books were those? 14 Α. Oh, my goodness, I couldn't 15 remember. You say they call it -- it's a 16 book of synonyms and antonyms. I don't know 17 if it was called a Thesaurus or not on the 18 cover page. 19 Q. You mentioned the Tropicana 20 transaction that you were involved in this 21 morning? 22 Α. Yes. As an example. 23 What transaction is that? Q. 24 Α. The sale of Tropicana to Coca-Cola. 25 What year did that take place? Q.

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Page 143 1 Oh, my goodness. It was a number 2 of years ago, but I am using it just as an 3 example. It's not a recent transaction. 4 What was your role in that Q. 5 transaction? 6 Dillon, Read, we were representing Α. 7 Tropicana. 8 Q. What was your role? 9 I was one of the investment bankers Α. 10 giving advice to Tropicana in dealing with 11 Coca-Cola. 12 Q. Were you on the deal teem? 13 Α. Yes. 14 0. And you don't recall the year you 15 said, right? 16 I just don't. Α. 17 Let's take a look at what's been 18 marked as Exhibit 194, which is a Bloomberg 19 transcript of a Q2 2014 earnings call dated 20 August 1, 2014. 21 Do you have that in front of you? 22 Α. I do. 23 You have seen this before, right? Q. 24 I have not seen this before, but I 25 have heard -- I read it being referred to in

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Page 144 1 terms of -- I think it was in one of the 2 expert reports of Mr. Hefron saying in this 3 earnings call, proxy will be coming out and 4 read it, et cetera, for important 5 information. 6 I missed that. You said -- thank 0. 7 you. 8 You didn't consider this transcript 9 in the formation of your opinions at all, 10 correct? 11 I did not read the -- I did not 12 receive nor did I read the actual earnings call other than what I had read about it 14 elsewhere. 15 Q. Okay. Thank you. 16 Based on your experience, you are 17 aware -- and this is dated August 1, 2014, 18 right? 19 Do you see that? 20 I don't see the date actually. Α. 21 But you will accept that? Q. 22 Α. Yes. 23 It's at the very top. I don't want 0. 24 to belabor it. 25 I do see it now. Α.

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Page 147 1 I mean, I know he is a defendant. 2 The main issues here, from my perspective, 3 Mr. Gooch has been the main person involved, at least in everything I have read. 4 5 Mr. Hefron doesn't refer back to 0. 6 the statement that you have opined is 7 misleading here in the earnings call, does 8 he? 9 He does not. Α. 10 And in your experience, these Ο. 11 earnings calls are followed closely by 12 sophisticated investors, right? 13 Α. Institutional investors generally 14 and analysts. I am not sure how many retail 15 investors are on there, but they are 16 generally followed. 17 Would you agree, based on your experience, that the market price of a stock 18 19 is generally driven by the views of 20 institutional investors and research 21 analysts? 22 MR. ZWICK: Objection. 23 I would say generally, yes. 24 BY MR. LYNCH: 25 And research analysts and 0.

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Page 148 1 institutional investors closely follow 2 earnings calls, right? 3 Α. They do. 4 0. I think you testified earlier you 5 have worked on proxy statements? 6 I'm sorry? Proxy statements. Α. 7 You have worked on proxy statements Ο. 8 before, right? 9 Α. Yes. 10 Proxy statements that are issued in 0. 11 connection with merger transactions, right? 12 Α. Yes. 13 You agree they are typically filed 14 sometime after a deal is announced, right? 15 Α. Yes. 16 About how long after, in your 0. 17 experience? 18 They are detailed documents. 19 takes a lot of drafting. I would say two 20 months plus. 21 I think we may have touched on this Ο. 22 this morning. You agree that proxy 23 statements typically contain information on 24 the process that leads up to the execution of 25 a merger agreement, right?

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Page 149 1 Α. Yes. 2 And the fact that merger proxies 3 contain that information is commonly known to 4 institutional investors, right? 5 That's correct. Α. 6 Commonly known to research analysts 7 as well, right? 8 Α. Correct. 9 If one wants to learn about the process that a board followed leading up to a 10 11 transaction, one would look first at the 12 proxy statement, right? 13 MR. ZWICK: Objection. 14 That would be correct. One does not expect to find surprises in the proxy 1.5 16 statement of the nature here. 17 BY MR. LYNCH: 18 You don't believe there is anything 19 misleading about the GFI merger proxy, do 20 you? 21 Α. Not that I see. It's quite 22 detailed. 23 Let me just ask you: If there was 24 any intention on the part of -- well -- if 25 one were to assume that the statement that

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- 1 experience, that to then tell that potential 2 acquirer that, Oh, hang on a minute, we are 3 going to go conduct a market check, that 4 might have the effect of alienating that 5 potential acquirer, right?
- 6 Yes, but that applies more to the 7 first scenario I mentioned, the Coca-Cola 8 scenario, as distinct from the others because 9 you are talking to these people at the same 10 general period of time, and one or two are 11 emerging as the front-runners. So when 12 you have picked the front-runner and the 13 best proposal, obviously, then you don't 14 go out and do a second, you know, market 15 check.
- My question is different, and I 0. think I have an answer to it, but let me just If you are negotiating with a confirm. single party on the other side, a single potential acquirer, and those negotiations have advanced to a certain degree, you would agree that to announce to that single party, your single potential acquirer, that you would like to conduct a market check would 25 create the risk of alienating that single

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Page 155 1 potential acquirer, right? 2 MR. ZWICK: Objection. 3 Yes, that could be the case, but it Α. 4 also gets right to this process, because 5 Gooch had been working practically -- for a 6 number of months without informing the board 7 on a CME deal. So by the time the special 8 committee got involved, CME, in effect, had 9 already put a proposal on the table, which 10 shouldn't have been the case if the board and 11 the special committee had been formed earlier 12 because they would have been talking to other 13 people at the same time with CME, so they 14 wouldn't have been boxed into that situation. 15 But, nevertheless, Greenhill still was 16 recommending that they perform a market 17 check, and that was their advice, and 18 Greenhill is an excellent investment banking 19 firm. 20 BY MR. LYNCH: 21 You would agree that in a deal 22 process, market checks can pose a risk of 23 diminishing the value that the company might 24 receive in a merger transaction --25 MR. ZWICK: Objection.

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    minutes were not sincerely held by him?
2
                He may have believed them, but I
3
    would certainly take the advice of Greenhill
4
    over that of Mr. Gooch almost any day in the
5
    area of M&A strategy and process and
6
    procedure.
7
                Do you think Greenhill knew more
          0.
8
    about GFI and the risks that GFI faced than
9
    Mr. Gooch?
10
                MR. ZWICK: Objection.
11
                Greenhill is very sophisticated in
12
    the area of M&A. They are a top investment
13
    banking firm.
14
    BY MR. LYNCH:
15
          0.
                You would agree, though, that
16
    managers and directors and executives of a
17
    company typically know more about the company
18
    than investment bankers advising that
19
    company, right?
20
                MR. ZWICK:
                            Objection.
21
                More about the company, not about
22
    the M&A process. And here we have a
23
    management with a known agenda of wanting
24
    to buy the IDB at the lowest price
25
    possible.
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1 likely?

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- A. Just plain statistics unless it's
- 3 clearly perceived by people to be an
- 4 undervalued transaction.
 - Q. But announcing a deal gives other potential acquirers the opportunity to perceive the value that others place on the target company?
- 9 Α. Yes and no. Some may have 10 particular knowledge of a company, but they 11 still can't get confidential information from 12 the company unless they, under the fiduciary 13 outs, unless they put forward what seems to 14 be a bona fide deal that could be deemed by a 15 board or a special committee to be a superior 16 proposal, and then they are entitled to get 17 confidential information or what have you but 18 not before that.
- So there is a lot of information they don't have to make an assessment.
 - Q. But announcing a deal with a fiduciary out in it allows other interested parties to make better offers for the target company if they were interested in doing so, right?

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Page 179 1 MR. ZWICK: Objection. 2 Possibly with the caveats that I Α. 3 just mentioned that they may not have the 4 inside information which would be critical 5 for them to come to that conclusion. 6 BY MR. LYNCH: 7 Let's take a look at your report, 8 please, Mr. Purcell, Exhibit 191, and I would 9 ask you to turn to page 7. 10 Do you have that in front of you? 11 Α. Yes. 12 I will focus your attention on 13 subparagraph 4 and the last sentence of that 14 subparagraph. 15 Α. The last sentence. 16 I will read it, but let me know if Ο. 17 you are not there yet. 18 The one that begins "in addition"? Α. 19 Q. Yes. 20 "In addition, the winning bid by 21 BGC was, in part, possible because BGC was 22 able to take advantage of the significant 23 cost savings synergy of approximately 90 24 million per year which the financial adviser 25 to Gooch, Jefferies & Company ('Jefferies'),

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Page 266 1 BY MR. LYNCH: 2 Mr. Purcell, please turn to 3 paragraph 51 of your opening report. I asked 4 you a few questions about this earlier. 5 it references a letter that GFI received on 6 July 29th from BGC, right? 7 Α. Yes. Are you offering any opinion on 8 0. 9 whether that letter should have been disclosed to GFI shareholders in connection 10 11 with the CME deal? 12 Α. No. I don't think -- it did not 13 need to be disclosed. I just listed it as a 14 fact. 15 Q. And if you go to page 22 --16 I am just looking at this too, 17 paragraph 51, just started to read it again. 18 And as I am looking at this, I think I 19 misstated because you asked me the question 20 and now I am -- when you referred me back to 21 this question -- this paragraph, I think -- I 22 can't remember exactly what I said, but I 23 think I misstated to you that my recollection 24 was that he owned the entire 13 1/2 percent 25 at July 29th, and I think it was only a